ployment, and capital formation. ' The impact of remittances on the consumption pattern in localities with heavy migration is also selectively investigated.
The analysis concerns itself first with an assessment of the spending behavior and the standard of living of individual remittance recipients and, then, with the local and aggregate effects of individual spending.
Overall, during the period 1960-87, migrant remittances summed to about $17.5 billion, covering, in the 1960s, about one-third of Greece's trade deficit but much less in later years. In 1971 alone, which is the reference year of the analysis here, remittances amounted to $470 million, equal to 14,090 million drachmas. Preceded by a decade of very high emigration-800,000 persons, that is, 9.5% of the 1971 Greek population-and followed by a period of declining emigration and rising repatriation, 1971 is an appropriate year for a summary account of migration effect^.^ Fortunately, enough relevant data from sources such as the population census, the household survey, and the input-output table as well as regional data were available for this migration period.
Methodology and Assumptions
Measuring the impact of migrant remittances beyond the first round of spending, in the depth depicted in figure 1, would be a very complex and formidable task, especially if some disaggregated sectoral analysis is attempted. To overcome these difficulties, some have suggested an informal case-by-case approach.1° One of the proposed possibilities is to conduct a statistical survey for obtaining the pattern of expenditure of remittance recipients, inserting these data into an input-output table, and then estimating the diffused direct and indirect effects on production and employment by industry." In this article I proceed partly in this spirit.
The tool kit of this analysis contains one Greek household survey, two input-output tables of Greece, a matrix converting the pattern of consumer expenditures into a structure of industry final demand, and, finally, the laborloutput and capitalloutput ratios by industry. Given the difficulties noted, the handling of the analysis requires considerable simplifications for quantifying the effects of remittances on the various sectors of the economy. Such simplifications concern mainly the assessment of pre-and postmigration income and the consumption patterns of remittance recipients, number of recipients, their spending behavior vis-a-vis that of their neighbors, and its impact on the neighbors' attitudes toward consumption.
To deal with these problems, the pertinent questions of who emigrates, with what occupation, and from which neighborhood must first be answered. Certainly, the probability to emigrate would be higher for members of larger families, for members of families with more economically nonactive persons, and for members of families with more unemployed. l 2 But apart from these family characteristics, the potential emigrant's occupation has a strong bearing on premigration income. Under given macroeconomic conditions, occupation determines the relative position of a potential migrant in the labor market and his or her ability to compete for desirable jobs and good earnings.
Finally, the community environment, and the relative economic and social status of a potential migrant family in it, exercises considerable influence on the migrant's income, the decision to emigrate, and the remittances to be sent to those left behind. 13 More specifically, the macroeconomic conditions of the community affect premigration income through the job and income opportunities offered to workers and families in different occupations (economic effect). These conditions can also affect postmigration income by commanding a social minimum amount of remittances, high enough to enable the family to catch up with neighbors, so that the decision to emigrate is justified and the social status of the migrant family in the community is elevated (social effect). l 4 So much for the factors that influence migrants and their remitting behavior. But can remittances change the consuming behavior of migrant families? There are diverging views on this. According to one view, the dissemination of information regarding foreign consumption patterns may induce spending on imported consumer durables.'"n contrast, others suggest that since remittance recipients are poor, they spend their additional income on basic domestic goods or on housing.16 Still others claim that part of the remittances may be consumed in the form of leisure, which, if it is substantial, may have some negative effects on agricultural production."
Finally, the question of whether the pattern of consumption of migrant families has some influence on the pattern of consumption of nonmigrant families is also raised.'' Some evidence for this points out that, except for spending on real estate and consumer durables, consumption patterns of migrant and nonmigrant families are not very different.l9 In fact, under certain conditions, and especially in small countries or local areas with high migration, nonmigrant families may benefit from remittances.'' One wonders whether there is, in such circumstances, some psychological drive pushing remittance recipients and others toward more urbanized consumption patterns and lifestyles, which became affordable with migration incomes.
Empirical analysis in Mexico found that the spending behavior of migrant families has a bearing on the family distribution of income in villages where remittances are a very high part of the income of the recipients.*' In the case of rural areas in Greece, migrant remittances are indeed claimed to be an important means for emulating urban consumption attitude^.'^ This emulation is exercised by imitating the dress, automobile-buying habits, and consumption of foreign spirits demonstrated by returning migrant^.'^ Thus, farm consumption patterns converge into urban consumption patterns not so much through consumption needs but, rather, through the means of consumpt i~n .~~ For the purposes of this article, I assume that the average consumption pattern of the entire Greek population cannot be affected, because the consequences of the individual behavior of remittance spenders are evaporated at the aggregate level. However, in regions that have experienced heavy emigration, remittance spending may have an impact on the local population's consumption pattern, a hypothesis that is tested in this article.
Assessing the Income of Remittance Recipients A. Premigration Income
It has been suggested that, although migrants may come from the less well-to-do sections of the population, they must nevertheless have the essential means to finance the cost of moving.25 This permits the plausible assumption that the average income per person of a potential migrant family within a broad occupational group in a given community would be lower than the corresponding average income per employed person in that occupational group and community. How much lower will depend on the relative demographic and economic characteristics of the potential migrant family in its environment.
Setting gvc as the ratio of economically active members over all members of the i family in the broad occupational group j in community c and setting uvc as the corresponding rate of family unemployment, the average income per person of this family (Yrc)will be:
where 5, = the average income per employed person within the j occupational group and the c community.
This expression takes care of the responsibility for family dependents and the family unemployed in formulating the average premigration income on which the decision to emigrate and the flow of remittances depend.26 The lower the value of gUc(l -uOc)is, the higher would be the probability that such a family will send some of its members abroad.
But for lack of statistical data on individual families, potential migrants will be identified at a more aggregated level by occupational and community characteristics in equation ( I ) , dropping subscript i from the variables and grouping, in effect, family structures ( g ) and family employment (1 -u ) accordingly. In other words,
where go,, ujc = respectively, the ratio of economically active to total family members and the unemployment rate of the j occupational group in c community.
Substituting from (2) into (I), the averge premigration income of potential remittance recipients (q) by occupational group and community is obtained as: where mjc = Mj,IMj = the share of migrants from j occupational group of c community in total national migration from j occupational group; and mj = MjIM = the share of migrants from j occupational group in total national migration, and
To conclude, there is a community effect on premigration income by occupational group, expressed by (4) , and an occupational effect on average national premigration income, expressed by (5).
B. Remittances
For the purpose of estimating remittances per recipient, I assume that the flow of remittances depends jointly on the capacity of the migrant to remit to the family left behind (supply) and on the claim of the family on the income of their emigrated members (demand).27 Supply is constrained by the migrant's saving target-assuming he is a temporary migrant, as the majority of the Greek migrants in Europe wereand demand is enhanced by the "needs" of the family in Greece.
Two kinds of needs, already hinted at, are the driving force for remittance demand, a livelihood need and a social need. The higher (lower) the livelihood need (i.e., the basics of subsistence), the lower (higher) is the premigration level of income (Y;). And the higher (lower) the social need (often generated by the desire or necessity to catch up with neighbors) the higher (lower) is the difference (q., -Y ; ) between recipient's and neighbors' income.
Thus, the minimum amount of required ex ante remittances (RE'")for migration to be justified should be equal to Ex post, however, this minimum remittance requirement may or may not be forthcoming, depending on the actual capacity of the migrant to remit per unit of his relatives' income. That is, where R; = remittances per migrant belonging, before migration, to j occupational group and coming from the c community.
The ratio rjc is a coefficient of adjustment of the ex ante expectations to ex post reality, giving actual remittances per recipient (RJc) as RJc = rjc ( qc-Y; ).
(8)
According to whether remittances per migrant are more than enough, just enough, or less than enough to satisfy the minimum sine qua non social need for remittances per recipient. On the other hand, any amount of R; contributes to the satisfaction of the livelihood need by raising the recipient's standard of living.
Aggregating analogously, occupational figures of average remittances per migrant (R?) and per recipient (RJ) are obtained as where Rjc = amount of remittances received by families in j occupational group and c community.
C. Postmigration Income
Adding premigration income and remittances per recipient according to our occupational and community distinctions, corresponding figures of postmigration incomes are obtained as follows:
D. Data
A detailed account of the compilation of the data used in this article is found in Appendix A. Some of these data are presented in the tables of the text and others in the tables of Appendix B.
The evidence on the 1961-70 emigration (800,000 persons) clearly indicates the presence of a considerable number of dependent family members and of remittance recipients. This is manifested in the fact that 84.3% of emigrants were in the 15-44 age brackets, 49.5% were married, and 58.5% were economically active. Finally, the fact that 60.1% of emigrants moved to Germany is an indication of the predominantly temporary character of migration (table B1 in App. B).
Concerning the occupational structure of migrants, two broad occupational groups-namely, farmers and farm workers (for reference called "farmers") and craftsmen, production-process workers, miners, and workers in transport and communications as well as simple laborers (called, collectively, "nonfarm workersw)-constitute, respectively, 36% and 52% of the 1961-70 sum of migrants. The remaining 12%-including 2% of professional and administrative workers (called "otherM)-complete the picture.
Our regional data permit the identification of 51 communities and, thence, 51 individual groups of potential migrant families by occupational category, reflecting the average family and employment characteristics of the 51 geographic departments of Greece. This connection between the characteristics of regions and of migrants is supported by empirical e~i d e n c e .~' Consequently, the family and occupational conditions of farmers and nonfarm workers, as defined, and their relative economic and social position in their communities would prevail in identifying potential emigrant families and in determining their pre-and postmigration income (App. A and table B2). The more concise community-weighted estimates by occupational group presented in table 1 show that the income per person of a migrant family before remittances was, on average for the three occupational groups, 38% of the weighted income per employed person, 24% of the income per employed person in Greece, and 58% of the per capita GNP. Farmers have a relatively higher proportion (41%) and nonfarm workers a relatively lower proportion (33%) of the weighted group average. These two major groups of recipients receive remittances exceeding by about one-third their premigration income, and the small group of other recipients receive a much lower amount.
IV. Empirical Model for the Impact of Remittances
Under the previous assumption of uniform consumer behavior of migrant and nonmigrant families, the premigration level of consumption per person of migrant family within the j occupational group (Cyb) is given by and the postmigration level (CJ@) is given by where s = average propensity to save out of premigration income, assumed to be equal for all occupational groups; q = the proportion Inserting DL in the input-output table, we get, along the p. row vector, the production of the p industry (X,) induced by the first round of remittance spending in each v industry. That is, x, = 1d, ,, DL.
We also get, down the v column vector, the production from each p. industry used in a single v industry as a result of spending in the v industry. That is, -output table and The imports (V,) contained in X, can be extracted by using an import content coefficient (y,), so that
The employment created by remittances is estimated by applying industry laborloutput ratios (LIO), to gross output (X,), an approach proposed also by other authors.29 That is, Capital formation is also estimated in a way similar to employment, by applying industry capitalloutput ratios (KIO), to gross production:
V. Evidence and Data Used in the Model
The prevailing view in the literature is that the marginal propensity to consume out of remittances is generally very high.30 This evidence comes from analytical studies and statistical surveys, referring to international migration and to rural-urban labor movements alike. This, and the fact that a high proportion of migrant earnings goes for the support of the family members at home, has motivated a number of authors to view remittances entirely as consumption e~penditure.~' However, some studies and surveys find no difference in the propensity to consume between comparable levels of incomes from remittances and from other sources.32 Also, a considerable proportion of remittances are found to be spent on housing, land, and machinery. 33 In the case of Greece, most remittances are spent on consumption but a substantial part goes into housing and a moderate amount into i n v e~t m e n t .~This evidence is supported by a survey conducted in Germany on the spending intentions of returning Greek migrants and is complemented by some macroeconomic data of remittance spending on housing. The evidence from these two entirely different sources, jointly evaluated in Appendix A, indicates that 62.6% of remittances are spent on consumption, 22.3% on housing, 3.5% on machinery, 4.0% on investment in trade, 0.4% on investment (nonmachinery) in agriculture, and 7.2% on the purchase of agricultural land. Notice that, by sheer coincidence, my calculated proportions on consumption and housing are almost identical with I. Gilani, M. F. Khan, and M. Igbal's figures for Pakistan (62% and 22%, re~pectively).~~ Based on this evidence, the 1971 flow of remittances, amounting to 14,090 million drachmas, are disposed of as presented in table 2.
To answer the question posed earlier in this article whether remittances are a driving force for a more urbanized pattern of consumption in localities with heavy migration, I chose for testing the geographic department of Florina in northern Greece. Florina has experienced the highest population exodus in Greece. From 1961 to 1970, 41.4% of its population, of which 61.7% were farmers, emigrated to foreign countries. Florina is, in fact, farm country, with 71.3% of its population living in rural areas and 64.4% working in agriculture (table B3) .
In 1971 remittances in Florina represented 48.9% of private output and were received by about one-third of the population. Remittances made up 62.4% of the income of recipients and 32.5% of the income of the population as a whole.
For empirical estimates, I use the 1974 household survey of Greece, the 1971 Greek input-output table, and a consumptionindustry conversion matrix contained in a study on the intersectoral impact of public e x p e n d i t~r e .~~
The import content coefficients are taken from a 1970 input-output table.37 Finally, capital in the KIO ratio refers to installed horse power capacity in manufacturing.
VI. Empirical Results

A . Individual Effects
Individual consumption patterns of recipients, before and after remittances, are obtained separately for farmers, nonfarm workers, and other workers in 1971 through equations (19) and (20) and Appendix figure 2 . According to these findings, remittances just about double the overall consumption expenditure of farmers, fall short of doubling it for nonfarm workers, and raise it by a little over half for other workers, giving an overall increase of about 91%.
Top priority spending for farmers and nonfarm workers alike is recreation, with a common increase of expenditure by 225%, whereas top priority for other recipients is transportation, with an expenditure increase of 114%. Although education comes first for all occupations combined, with remittances raising expenditure by 226.3%, it is a second priority for nonfarm workers, and it is seventh for farmers, whose second priority is apparel and footwear. Nonfarm workers and other workers increase considerably their consumption of durables. At the other end of the spectrum, all three groups of recipients raise relatively moderately (19%-61%) their after-remittances expenditures on heating and lighting and on beverages and tobacco.
B. Local Effects
The same procedure as for individual effects is applied to the relevant data of Florina, with the exception that there is no distinction among occupational groups, as it is not necessary for our purposes here. The aim is to test the move toward more urbanized consumption patterns, not only of remittance recipients but also of the whole population of the department. Therefore, incomes per recipient and per capita of the population, without and with remittances, are compared with the average rural, semi-urban, and urban consumption patterns, as given by the corresponding household surveys.39
These calculations (table 4) show that remittances have raised the standard of living of recipients in Florina from a level equal to 72% of the average level of expenditures in rural areas of Greece to a level exceeding it by 6093, overshooting even the average standard of living in semi-urban areas.
Postremittance expenditures on all items of consumption, except health and personal care, surpass corresponding average expenditures in rural areas, and in some cases-communications, recreation, and education-they more than double. For most items, the after-remittances expenditures have, in fact, exceeded the average of semi-urban areas of Greece. And, in five cases in particular, including beverages, apparel and footwear, and durables (which, as noted above, are means for emulating urbanized standards of living), expenditures with remittances actually surpass the average for urban areas.
But apart from recipients, the whole population of Florina has also benefited from remittances. Their standard of living was raised from a level equal to 81% of the average for rural areas to a level just passing it. In nine items, including curre1.t household expenses, communications, and education, the after-remittance expenditures well exceeded the average of rural areas, whereas in three cases, namely, beverages, tobacco, and household expenses, they exceeded the average of semi-urban areas.
In conclusion, these findings appear to affirm that the consumer behavior of people, in localities highly exposed to migration movements, could be affected by the spending habits of returning migrants and their relatives, driving them to more urbanized patterns of consumption.
C. Macroeconomic Effects
Despite the vast increase in individual consumption expenditures brought about by remittances, their share in aggregate consumption is only 3% (table 5). Relatively higher are the shares in education, apparel and footwear, communications, and recreation, ranging between 3.8% and 4.4%. It is clear thus that, dispersed in the economy at large, individual spending affects rather thinly aggregate consumption expenditure.
Inserting the consumption and nonconsumption expenditures by industry as final demand in the 35 x 35 Greek input-output table, the overall impact of remittances on production by industry is obtained with equations (25) and (26). Then, based on this production, equations (27)- (29) give, respectively, the imports, employment, and capital formation generated by remittances. These findings are presented in table 6 .
The analytical results show that spending about Dr 14 billion of migrant remittances generates Dr 24 billion worth of gross outputequal to 4.1% of total gross production in the economy-giving a multiplier of 1.7. In nearly one-third of the industries, the multiplier is over 2.0, with highest values of 2.6-2.7 in apparel and footwear, leather, and electrical machinery industries. A multiplier below 1.3 apears in the service industries at the bottom of table 6. In construction, which is affected by the demand for housing, the multiplier is 2.0.
Only a rather small number of industries is affected strongly by remittance spending. Seven of them-agriculture, food, textiles, construction, transport, trade, and miscellaneous services-produce about 56% of total induced production. Equally high proportions are found in mining (10.2%), paper (9. I%), and machinery (16.2%). As a result of these developments, remittances have, in effect, contributed by half in the 8% real growth rate of GDP in 1971. Imports share by 12.8% in induced gross production, with food, chemicals, machinery, and electrical machinery jointly claiming 47% (machinery alone 18.7%) of these imports.
The employment potentially created by remittances amounted to about 74,000 new jobs in the nonagricultural sector of the economy, excluding public service^.^' These jobs represent 4.7% of the 1971 corresponding level of employment. Higher proportions of employment were created in mining (10.3%),manufacturing (5.2%),construction (4.7%),trade (4.4%),and services (4.2%).In manufacturing industries, the addition to employment was relatively high in machinery (16.2%)-in which 3.5% of remittances are spent-in paper (9.1%), and in metallurgy (7.5%). Strong generators of employment, with a contribution of 58% to new job creation, are apparel and footwear, construction, transportation, trade, and other services.
The capital generated by remittances, expressed in horsepower capacity, equals 8% of the installed capacity in man~facturing.~' Relatively higher proportions are observed in machinery (25.3%), oil (15.5%), apparel and footwear (12.5%),and the paper industry (1 .a%). All other industries are around or below the average for manufacturing.
Focusing on the effects of spending on consumption in general and on investment, the findings of this study give similar production multipliers of 1.8 and 1.9, respectively (table 7). What is perhaps of particular interest is that, contrary to popular opinion, expenditure on housing is very productive, with a multiplier of 2.0, which is actually much higher than the multiplier of spending on machinery (1.7) .
With the first round of spending, the production induced by the demand for consumption goods consists of only 2.9% of investment ' NOTE.-Column 3 = column 2: column I. Column 5 = column 4: column 2. Column 7 = column 6 : column 1. Column 8 = column 6 : column 2. Column 10 = column 9:column 6.
* 11,774 jobs were created in construction industry. t 2,705 jobs were created in machinery industry. products. In contrast, the production induced by the demand for investment goods consists of 17.3% of investment products. The purchase of machinery, in particular, generates production of investment goods equal to 66.7% of induced production. Investments in housing and investment related to trade and agriculture generate corresponding investment products equal to 46.3%, 17.4%, and 0%, respectively, of induced production.
Concerning the controversial issue of remittance leakages to foreign countries, a proportion of 21.5% of remittances are found to be spent directly and indirectly on imported goods. That is, out of each dollar spent in Greece, about 22 cents go abroad, a considerable amount of which goes to the migrant host countries for buying final and intermediate goods and for machinery. This evidence corroborates the claim of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that a high proportion of remittances goes to imports, although they seem to refer only to the first round of spending. 42 The demand for consumption goods induces imports equal to 18.7% of original spending, and the demand for investment goods induces imports equal to 32.3% of original spending. An extremely high proportion (96.6%) of imports stems from the demand for machinery, a relatively moderate proportion (26.5%) from the demand for housing, and rather low proportions from the demand for investment goods related to trade (10.0%) and to agriculture (12.1%).
Imports make up 10.6% of the production induced by demand for consumption goods and 17.0% of the production induced by demand for investment goods. Purchase of machinery brings imports equal to 58.4% of induced production and investment in housing brings imports equal to 13.1% of induced production. The corresponding figures for trade and agriculture are much lower.
Investment goods make up 26.6% of imports, and consumption goods 73.4%. Of the imports that are induced by the demand for consumption goods, 10.8% are investment goods; and of the imports induced by the demand for investment goods, 45.6% are capital goods. An extremely high content (95.8%) of capital goods have imports due to the demand for machinery, a relatively high content (46.4%) due to the demand for investment goods related to trade, and a relatively low content (16.9%) is induced by the demand for housing.
The employment-generating capacity is highest in the case of demand for investment goods related to the trade industry, referring to the opening of small mostly touristic shops by returning migrants. Each million drachmas spent on establishing such shops creates about 23 jobs. Much lower is the job capacity creation in housing and machinery, with seven jobs each per million drachmas of expenditure. Overall, remittances spent on investment goods generate about twice as many jobs as remittances spent on consumption (nine and four jobs, respectively, per million drachmas of remittances).
It appears, thus, that the findings clearly demonstrate the fallacy of the assumption that first-round spending of remittances on noninvestment goods-consumption and housing-does not constitute productive spending. On the contrary, spending even on final consumer goods has a considerable impact on industries producing investment goods, whereas investment in housing is very productive and keeps the multiplier benefits well within the domestic economy. Investment (machinery) spending, on the other hand, which is generally considered to be productive, turns a substantial part of the benefits over to foreign countries through the purchase of imported goods.
It must be pointed out, however, that despite the rather high proportions of imports induced by remittances, these imports represent only 4.9% of Greece's total imports. Therefore, the macroeconomic consequences of remittance leakages to imports should not be serious for the trade deficit. This rather moderate aggregate effect on imports seems to conform to the experience of other countries.43
These findings also demonstrate that the impact of remittances on employment and capital formation is not negligible. This evidence challenges the claims that remittances do not create employment opp o r t~n i t i e s~ãnd that they do not contribute to capital formation because they are spent on imports and on investment in housing.45
VII. Concluding Remarks
This article proposes a methodology for a comprehensive empirical analysis of the impact of migrant remittances on the migrant source country. Probing below the surface of the first round effects of spending, the purpose of this methodology is to test various often contradictory views and popular convictions as to the pros and cons of the effect remittances have on economic development. The effort is to provide an overall picture of individual and aggregate income effects of remittances, using the case of Greece as an example.
My calculations of direct and indirect effects show considerable benefits and limited costs for the Greek economy. The individual pattern of consumption of remittance recipients improves very drastically, as does the local standard of living in areas of heavy migration, as the recipients shift to more urbanized consumption habits. At the aggregate level, remittances do not seem to have the power to impose any serious burdens on the balance of payments, despite their strong import-generating effect. On the contrary, remittances promote economic growth, employment, and capital formation.
If there are any merits in this methodology, they lie in the fact that perhaps it has captured some additional effects of remittances that other more traditional approaches, concentrating only on the first round of remittance spending, could not bring out. This is, it is hoped, an advancement enriching the relevant literature, and it may possibly contribute to the resolution of some fallacies and false conclusions stemming from doctrinaire convictions or partial analyses.
Appendix A Data
Regional Income per Employed by Occupational Group
Agricultural income, wages and salaries net of social security contributions, and the income of self-employed are the figures used as proxies of corresponding incomes of farmers, nonfarm workers, and other workers by geographic department. Regional incomes by department are taken from E. Voloudakis and E. P a n~u r g i a s .~The regional employment data for the three occupational groups are taken from the 1971 Population C e n s~s .~'
Economically Active and Nonactive Family Members
Figures on gjc are not directly available and are approximated by setting gjc = hcgj,where hc = the ratio of family size in c community over family size in the country, obtained from the 1971 Population Census, and gj = the ratio of economically active to total family members in j occupational group in the country, taken from the 1974 Household Survey; these figures are 0.47 for farmers, 0.38 for nonfarm workers, and 0.42 for other workers.48
Unemployment by Occupational Group
Regional unemployment rates are not available by occupation of previous employment, but they are available by three subdivisions of geographic departments-that is, rural, semi-urban, and urban areas.49 Each of these areas has a different weight in the number of migrants from the department; that is, farmers come mostly from rural areas, and nonfarm workers are more likely to come from semi-urban and urban areas. Therefore, the weighted average unemployment rate by occupational group and department can be approximated by where ajc, = the share of workers of j occupational group in r area of c community in total workers o f j occupational group in c community; ucr = the unemployment rate in r area of c community; and r = 1, 2, 3 (rural, semiurban, and urban areas).
The unemployment rate ujcis then the reflection of the relative employment conditions in each area in the department (ucr) and of the relative significance of each occupational group in each area of the department (ajc,). However, since M,. refers to the total migration of a department-there is no breakdown by economically active and nonactive migrants-Mjc also refers, by necessity, to total migrants that are related (dependent family members) to economically active migrants within j occupational group. For Greece, the stock of migrants abroad in 1971, which is the basis for calculating remitters by occupational group and region, is approximated by the sum of the 1961-70 emigration flows, 1961 being the first year of the mass emigration to Europe.S'
Remittances per Migrant by Occupational Group and Region
The figures by occupational group are derived by splitting remittances of geographic departments, given in Voloudakis and Panourgias, according to the occupational shares of migrants in the total migration of the department as calculated above.52 Implicit here is the assumption of uniform conditions of remitters, irrespective of their working possibilities abroad. In addition, a survey conducted in Germany on the spending plans of returning Greek migrants found that they intended to spend 29% of their accumulated savings to buy houses, 2.6% to buy machinery (agricultural and other), 7 .7% to open small shops, and 9.3% for the acquisition of agricultural land, leaving 51.4% for c~n s u r n~t i o n .~'
The difference between the two proportions of spending on housing-that is, 29% of accumulated savings of migrants and 22.3% of the current flow of remittances-can be attributed to the different spending attitudes of repatriating migrants and of relatives receiving remittances for support. The former alone should be expected to spend more on housing or on any other investment than they would jointly with their relatives, to whom the annual flow of remittances refers. This being so, the ratio 22.3129.0 = 0.77 can be used as an adjustment coefficient, turning the intended investment of repatriating migrants into actual joint investment of migrants and relatives. This way, the investment expenditure, given above, is expressed on the basis of the 1971 flow of remittances. The figures so obtained are housing, 22.3%; machinery, 2.0%; small shops, 5.9%; and agricultural land, 7.2%, leaving for consumption 62.6%.
There still remains the problem of allocating investment in small shops to industries, which is needed for the input-output analysis. I split this proportion (5.9%) on the basis of information from the Ministry of National Economy relative to the approved (for subsidization) investment projects of migrants. According to this information, about 64.2% of the approved investment in value during the period 1982-84-there is no good reason to believe that things would have been much different in 1971-went to the tertiary sector, mostly in touristic shops, which I put in the trade industry (3.9%).j8 Another 27.2% of investment went to the secondary sector, which I put in the machinery industry (1.6%), and finally, the rest, 8.6% of investment, went to agriculture (0.4%). With this allocation, the final breakdown of remittance expenditure is 62.6% for consumption, 30.2% for nonconsumption goods (investment)-of which 22.3% is in housing, 3.6% in machinery, 3.9% in trade, and 0.4 in agriculture-and 7.2% for agricultural land. These percentages, together with the corresponding absolute figures are given in table 1.
A final note in this context is that the purchase of agricultural land will not be used as final demand in the input-output table, assuming that it actually constitutes transfers of cultivated land whose effects on the economy are already accounted for. Naturally, some of the proceeds from the sale of land may be invested elsewhere.59 But since we have no knowledge of it, such proceeds cannot be allocated to particular industries and are therefore omitted. 
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